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This paper discusses the challenges and benefits of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is under construction
and expected to be operational on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia in
a few years. Like many large-scale projects on transboundary riv-
ers, the GERD has been criticized for potentially jeopardizing
downstream water security and livelihoods through upstream uni-
lateral decision making. In spite of the contentious nature of the
project, the authors argue that this project can provide substantial
benefits for regional development. The GERD, like any major river
infrastructure project, will undeniably bring about social, environ-
mental, and economic change, and in this unique case has, on
balance, the potential to achieve success on all fronts. It must
be stressed, however, that strong partnerships between riparian
countries are essential. National success is contingent on regional
cooperation.
Energy Development and the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam
Insufficient energy supply, minimal infrastructure, and weak
economies are common characteristics of most developing coun-
tries. Sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly East Africa, comprises
a collection of such countries of whom a strikingly large number
have low human development indicators (UNDP 2014). Many of
these low-income countries are primarily reliant on rain-fed agri-
culture and thus highly vulnerable to variations in seasonal rainfall,
particularly recurrent drought (IWMI 2016). Extreme hydro-
climatic conditions often impose significant negative impacts
across scales, ranging from household to regional to national levels
that span various sectors, including agriculture, energy, industry,
transport, health, and ecosystems (Grey and Sadoff 2006; Di Falco
et al. 2012; Sadoff et al. 2015). Mitigating these impacts is crucial
for sustainable development.
The energy sector is one of the least developed in Africa, espe-
cially in the Sub-Saharan region. The Africa Progress Report
(2015) indicates the desperate shortage of electricity in Sub-
Saharan African countries, with average consumption at 162 kWh
per capita per year, excluding South Africa. This is strikingly low
compared to the 7,000 kWh per capita per year global average.
Ethiopia’s consumption is also one of the lowest at 57 kWh per
capita per year as estimated in 2012 (World Bank 2015). The report
also highlights how Africa’s energy deficit stands in stark contrast
to the region’s potential; Ethiopia, for example, has only developed
approximately 10% of its hydropower capacity (USAID 2015;
MoFED 2010; Bureau of Reclamation 1964). Considering this
and numerous studies that demonstrate parallels between managing
hydrological variability and economic growth (e.g., World Bank
2006; FDRE 2008; Sadoff et al. 2015), the Ethiopian government
has prioritized hydroelectric expansion to support its economic de-
velopment goal of 11% GDP growth rate per annum (MoFED
2010). This has led to recent construction of a number of hydro-
power projects (Table 6.1 in Cuesta-Fernández 2015), of which the
GERD is the largest. The economic implications of large-scale
water storage have often been debated; however, more recently
the benefits of storage have been noted in both qualitative and
empirical studies (e.g., SIWI 2005; World Bank 2006; Grey and
Sadoff 2007; Sadoff et al. 2015), suggesting that greater water
availability has a significant and positive causal effect on country-
level economic growth. Sub-Saharan African countries have
remarkably low per capita water storage compared with most
middle-income and upper-income countries (Grey and Sadoff
2006), thus increasing capacity may lead to positive development
and substantial gains not just in energy, but other sectors as well.
Ethiopia’s GERD, under construction since 2011, straddles
the Blue Nile River close to the Ethiopian–Sudanese border
(Fig. 1). Estimated to cost almost $5 billion (Arjoon et al. 2014),
the Ethiopian-financed dam will be a roller compacted and rein-
forced structure 1,780 m long and 145 m high, making the dam
the largest in Africa (Abdelhady et al. 2015). Two powerhouses
consisting of 16 Francis Turbines are planned to provide 6,000 MW
of installed capacity (Salini Impregilo 2015), with two turbines in-
stalled at a lower elevation to facilitate power generation prior to
dam completion. Construction of high-voltage transmission lines
from the GERD to domestic locations and to neighboring countries
(e.g., Sudan and Kenya; Cuesta-Fernández 2015) is underway.
Total reservoir storage capacity will equal 74 billionm3, creating
a 1,874 km2 lake that extends 246 km upstream when full. The
reservoir is partially supported by a rock-filled and concrete-lined
saddle dam located on the left bank, one of the largest in the world
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at a length of 5.2 km. Inflow to the reservoir site averages
48 billionm3 annually (Whittington et al. 2015), dominated by
the main rainy season occurring in June through September (Taye
et al. 2015). No water consumption activities or diversions are
planned for the reservoir behind the GERD (ENPoE 2013).
Pros and Cons of the GERD Project
Investments in large dam projects are often controversial. Support-
ers often denote benefits such as flood control, water supply,
and hydroelectric generation, while critics frequently highlight
permanent ecosystem changes, modification of river flows, reduc-
tion of fish passage and sediment accumulation, and community
displacement (WCD 2000). In 2000, the World Commission on
Dams (WCD) published a comprehensive report on large dams (de-
fined as dams greater than 15 m in height and storage capacity
greater than 3 millionm3), recommending that sustainable im-
provements to human welfare from economic, social, and environ-
mental perspectives be demonstrated prior to construction (WCD
2000). The report emphasizes that the large dam debate should
clearly extend beyond infrastructure to include environmental im-
pacts, sustainability, economic and financial aspects, and equitable
sharing of project costs and benefits across the region.
In light of the WCD report, the GERD is a controversial project
in the Nile basin (Chen and Swain 2014), particularly considering
the long-standing agreement between Egypt and Sudan, namely
the 1959 Nile Treaty. This agreement allocates 55.5 billion and
18.5 billionm3 of the Nile River water to Egypt and Sudan,
respectively; an additional 10 billionm3 are lost to infiltration
and evaporation from Lake Nasser. These allocations and losses
account for the annual average total of 84 billionm3 reaching
the High Aswan Dam (HAD) (Murakami 1995). No consumptive
allocations to other upstream riparian countries (Ethiopia, Uganda,
Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic Congo
(DRC), and Eritrea; Fig. 1) are prescribed. In response to the GERD,
downstream countries (Sudan and Egypt) have raised concerns re-
garding the possible reduction of water, constituting a breach of
the 1959 Treaty. Ethiopia and riparian countries on the White Nile
River contest that they are not party to the 1959 Treaty and are en-
titled to an “equitable share” as long as there is no significant harm to
downstream users. This stance was formalized through the recent
Cooperative Framework Agreement, although unsurprisingly Egypt
and Sudan did not sign on (NBI 2015).
Numerous studies highlight the potential negative impacts of the
GERD on Egypt and Sudan (e.g., Chen and Swain 2014; J-WAFS
2014; Ahmed and Elsanabary 2015; Bastawesy 2015). Chen and
Swain (2014) evaluate strategic priorities, sustainability standards
according to the WCD’s framework, and geopolitical significance,
concluding that project planning and protocol has largely ignored
the WCD’s guidelines and offered limited transparency. A major
concern they present is the estimated displacement and relocation
of over 12,000 people, which is substantial but smaller than other
large dam projects (Whittington et al. 2015). International Rivers
(2015) estimates a total displacement of 40 to 80 million people
worldwide because of large dams, most of them in China and India.
While the displacement of people at any rate is undesirable, com-
pared to the 1 million people displaced by the Three Gorges Dam in
China to generate 22,000 MW (National Geographic 2010), the
12,000 displaced by the GERD (Chen and Swain 2014) to generate
6,000 MW is notably less.
Most people living in proximity to the dam are impoverished
subsistence farmers, fisher-people, and hunters (Veilleux 2013).
Preserving this rural/traditional lifestyle (with no dam) may be pref-
erable to some, however others argue that potentially raisingmillions
of people out of poverty through energy and economic growth out-
weighs preserving traditional lifestyles and some environmental
damages (Bekele and Lautze 2009). Additionally, they argue, com-
pensation is provided for displaced people (Abdelhady et al. 2015;
Fortin 2014). The expected impact on cultural heritage loss is low as
the location of the GERD is in a sparsely populated part of Ethiopia.
Reductions in downstream river flows will likely be most sig-
nificant during the reservoir filling stage. While this is consequen-
tial for both Sudan and Egypt, only the latter is largely dependent
on the Nile as a sole water source for all water related activities.
Abdelhaleem and Helal (2015) conclude that a reduction of more
than 5–15% may significantly affect Egypt’s water supply, irriga-
tion, and safe navigation, however Mulat and Moges (2014) find
that the filling period would not adversely affect Egypt’s ability to
irrigate. Zhang et al. (2015) provide a set of plausible filling polices
and associated average reduction in streamflow, finding that
impounding 10% (25%) of monthly streamflow during the first
5 years of filling may result in a corresponding average reduction
of 6% (14%) at Lake Nasser, behind Egypt’s HAD. These figures
may vary significantly, between 0.6 and 15.4%, depending on the
hydro-climatic conditions of the first few years of filling. Accord-
ing to Mulat and Moges (2014), a reduction in annual energy pro-
duction from the HAD is estimated at 12% and 7% during and after
the filling stage, respectively, under a 6-year filling period plan,
however this assumes that the HAD’s operations do not change.
Thus, Egypt may incur economic losses during the filling stage,
which may be further affected by hydro-climatic conditions and
Sudan’s level of withdrawals (Kahsay et al. 2015).
Fig. 1. Nile basin location in Africa including riparian countries and
the forthcoming GERD in Ethiopia and the HAD in Egypt
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According to the Ethiopian government (MoFED 2010), hydro-
electricity from the GERD is expected to primarily satisfy national
demand long-term, with surpluses exported to neighboring coun-
tries. However, since GERD production is likely to outpace domes-
tic consumption due to insufficient infrastructure in the near future
(e.g., peak demand was approximately 1,500 MW in 2014; World
Bank 2014), exports to neighboring countries are highly likely
(EAPP 2005). In 2014 Ethiopia generated 3,967 GWh of surplus
energy, with projections for the coming years at approximately
20,000 GWh (Cuesta-Fernández 2015). Given this domestic and
regional influx of energy, and simultaneously considering various
hydrologic and withdrawal scenarios, the expected positive impact
of the GERD on real GDP in the Eastern Nile region may be
5.5–8.8% during both the filling and operational stages (Kahsay
et al. 2015). In addition, a 5.5% increase in employment of un-
skilled labor in Ethiopia is estimated during the construction stage
of the project (Kahsay et al. 2015).
The minimum annual net benefit for Sudan and Egypt is ex-
pected to increase from $4.9 to $5.6 billion in the agriculture
and energy sectors with the GERD online; much of this increase
is a result of the GERD’s ability to provide supplemental flow
(Kahsay et al. 2015; Arjoon et al. 2014). The availability of regu-
lated streamflow for downstream countries better supports hydro-
power generation and provides options for year-round irrigated
agriculture. This is particularly the case for Sudan as the Roseries
dam reservoir is currently only able to support irrigation water for a
few months per year (Pearce 2015). The GERD’s ability to regulate
hydrologic variability is also likely to lead to a reduction in prop-
erty losses due to flooding, especially in Khartoum (Whittington
et al. 2015).
Sediment yield from the Upper Blue Nile basin is approximately
131 million t=year (Betrie et al. 2011), and trapping this behind the
GERD may cause both positive and negative externalities on down-
stream countries. Reduced sediment loads will likely extend reser-
voir life in Sudan and Egypt and lessen silt build-up in irrigation
canals; it is estimated that Sudan could save $50 million per annum
in dredging costs alone (Tesfa 2013; Swanson 2014). Similarly,
pumping head to overcome silt build up on irrigated cropland
may increase more slowly. Finally, improved water quality and re-
duced treatment costs for drinking water supply may also result. In
contrast, downstream soil fertility is likely to fall, particularly af-
fecting flood-recession agriculture in Sudan (in conjunction with
the likely elimination of annual bank flooding), with estimated
losses in recession agricultural land on the order of tens of thou-
sands of hectares (J-WAFS 2014).
What Makes the GERD Different?
Similar to most large dams around the world, the GERD will im-
pose both positive and negative externalities on the Eastern Nile
region. The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD)
estimates that more than 845,000 dams exist globally, with approx-
imately 58,000 registered as large dams (height of 15 m or more)
(Jacquot 2009). Of these large dams, approximately 24,000 are lo-
cated in China and 9,000 in the United States (ICOLD 2015). In
contrast, Sub-Saharan African countries, excluding South Africa,
collectively have approximately 500 large dams, with fewer than
10 located in the Blue Nile basin and only three in the Upper Blue
Nile basin (Ethiopia). The GERD may thus represent a response to
the enormous regional potential for energy production, exception-
ally low energy consumption at present, and the importance of en-
ergy advancement to strengthen economies and reduce poverty in
the region (Africa Progress Report 2015; Kahsay et al. 2015).
The GERD reservoir is to be located in a deep gorge, producing
a relatively small surface area considering its volume. This, coupled
with relatively cooler temperatures, may serve to constrain evapo-
ration as compared to reservoirs further downstream, particularly
those in desert locations. According to Mulat and Moges (2014),
the mean annual evaporation at the HAD is nearly 2.4 m=year,
whereas evaporation behind the GERD is expected to be closer
to 1.8 m=year. Studies suggest that storing water in a much cooler
environment in the long run may in fact increase Egypt’s water sup-
ply (Blackmore and Whittington 2008; Jeuland and Whittington
2014). Of course this implies coordinated operations; estimates of
mean annual loss from jointly operating the GERD and the HAD
may be 16% less than current losses from the HAD alone (Mulat
and Moges 2014).
Ethiopia has not secured external financing to construct
the GERD. While some argue this is in response to the project’s
potential for increasing water conflict in the region (International
Rivers 2014), others point to Ethiopia’s desire to prove its growing
economy and sense of national pride. Thus, Ethiopia has raised
funds by selling government bonds to citizens and private compa-
nies and by tapping into government reserves. This self-financing
may be a unique situation unlike other large dam projects in Africa,
in which countries are indebted to foreign lenders for decades after
the completion of the project (e.g., the Democratic Republic of
Congo’s Grand Inga hydropower projects; MONGABAY 2013).
However, the result of diverting funding from other sectors and po-
tential projects on the midterm to long-term domestic economy is
unclear and warrants further analysis.
Arguably, improved regional cooperation and stability through
affordable, available energy may be achievable through this project.
Instituting a basin-wide power trade scheme is presented as a way
forward that may enhance economic growth and welfare in all
Eastern Nile countries (Kahsay et al. 2015). Studies that focus
on the hydro-economics of the project conclude that cooperation
among riparian countries could significantly increase basin-wide
economic benefits (e.g., Arjoon et al. 2014; Kahsay et al. 2015).
Ethiopia also has ambitious plan to establish power trade relations
with distant nations, including Egypt, South Africa, and even
Yemen (Cuesta-Fernández 2015); however, to date infrastructure
connections only reach Sudan. Achieving such a high level of in-
terconnection is nontrivial. The required investment costs will be
substantial, and the source or potential for financing is unclear.
The availability of relatively constant and predictable release
from the GERD under normal operating conditions may particu-
larly benefit Sudan’s agriculture and hydropower sectors. Such
has been the case for Sudan since the Ethiopian Tekeze Dam on
the Atbara River came online, effectively reducing flood-induced
losses, trapping silt, and providing farmers sufficient irrigation to
plant multiple crops per year (Sudan Vision 2013). Similar positive
externalities are expected from the GERD, prompting some within
Sudan to extend support for the project given the net national and
regional gains (Jemal 2014). This endorsement is remarkable given
Ethiopia’s initial unilateral decision.
Remaining Challenges
According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
historical climatic patterns will likely shift under evolving
climate conditions resulting in changes with respect to water re-
sources availability and reliability in the forthcoming decades
(IPCC 2012). Considering that typical hydropower project life-
cycles exceed 50 years, the possible impact of climate change, both
temperature rise and rainfall variability, requires prudent attention
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(Block and Strzepek 2010). Previous studies in the Nile region have
consistently indicated projected increases in temperature; however,
there appears to be little consensus regarding precipitation and
streamflow projections in terms of magnitude, seasonality and di-
rection of change (Satti et al. 2015; Taye et al. 2015). Although
climate-change impacts are uncertain, current climate variability
(year-to-year) is high, indicating the need to cautiously consider
its effects on management and policy during the filling and
operation stages. Further studies addressing flexible and adaptable
strategies are therefore warranted.
Ethiopia’s continued reliance on fuel wood, with some estimates
of consumption outpacing replacement (Howell 2011), is continu-
ing to foster highland deforestation. This loss in vegetative cover
contributes to increased soil erosion and reduced soil nutrients;
potentially leading to reduced agricultural yields, possibly setting
up a cycle whereby more land needs to be cleared for agriculture
(Howell 2011). Rural electrification may thus promote reduced
deforestation and sediment loss rates from the highlands. On the
downstream receiving end, sedimentation risks threatening the
performance and lifetime of the GERD are not yet well understood.
Land-use changes in the upper Blue Nile basin over the past
decades, particularly deforestation of natural vegetation and the ex-
pansion of agricultural land, have caused significant changes in
sediment load (Gebremicael et al. 2013). Based on Betrie et al.’s
(2011) model simulations, this sediment yield may be reduced
by applying filter strips, stone bunds, and reforestation measures
at different subbasins and watershed outlets. Hence, advanced
soil-conservation measures upstream of the dam may reduce the
consequence of excessive sedimentation on the performance and
lifetime of the GERD.
Regarding basin-wide water management, the historical agree-
ments between Egypt and Sudan in 1929 and 1959 need to be re-
visited, particularly in the context of the Nile Basin Cooperative
Framework Agreement (CFA). Currently, Sudan uses less than
its allocation according to the 1959 agreement, but this may soon
change given Sudan’s development plans, climate change, and the
GERD (Satti et al. 2015). This adds more pressure to the situation,
particularly if decisions are predominantly unilateral. Although
travel time between the GERD and HAD is approximately 30 days,
there is a need for coordinated operations, particularly during low-
flow or high-flow periods, to promote efficiency at both facilities
and other sectoral activities (e.g., irrigated agriculture, flood con-
trol, etc.; J-WAFS 2014). Remarkably there is still no water-sharing
agreement satisfying all riparian countries, which is desperately
needed. Improved water accounting may also be justified. Senay
et al. (2014) estimate that nearly 97 km3 of water reaches the
HAD under natural flow conditions, significantly larger than the
often cited 84 km3 value.
Through the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (part of the
Nile Basin Initiative) the region is encouraged to share data and
information with respect to hydro-solidarity principles, which en-
courages equitable and reasonable utilization of international
watercourses. The importance of in situ observational networks
for resource assessment and basin management cannot be over-
stated. The Blue Nile Region in general and the management of
GERD in particular will require high quality hydro-meteorological
data. Although the availability and quality of historical in situ data
are limited and vary from country to country, instituting a frame-
work for open data sharing will improve the understanding and
quantification of the spatiotemporal dynamics of the resources.
This may lead to more-effective management and operation of
resources in the region and facilitate fact-based dialogue among
riparian countries. Furthermore, regional countries should take fur-
ther advantage of available satellite-based data and products that
can provide synoptic coverage with a uniform methodology and
high level of consistency. The integration of satellite data with
in situ measurements could be used as an alternative resource
for the Eastern Nile basin to routinely monitor water levels,
drought, and flood hazards. In such a hydro-politically tense region,
utilizing satellite data may bring trust among riparian countries.
The ongoing construction of the GERD has brought the
international spotlight to the Nile basin, with riparian country re-
lations oscillating between contentious and cooperative. How
regional planning transpires, in a coordinated cooperative frame-
work or not, will surely set a precedent for future development
across the basin. The potential for increasing shared benefits is
strong, but collectively realizing those benefits will require an even
stronger united will.
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